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Abstract: Since 1980, US corporate valuations have risen relative to assets and
operating margins have grown. The possibility of sustained economic rents has
raised concerns about economic dynamism and inequality. But rising profits could
come from political rents or, instead, from returns to investments in intangibles.
Using new data on Federal regulation and data on lobbying, campaign spending,
R&D, and organizational capital, this paper finds that both intangibles and political
factors account for a substantial part of the increase in profits, but since 2000
political factors are more important. A difference-in-differences analysis finds that
major expansions of regulation increase profits significantly.
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Introduction
Corporate valuations in the US have seen a sustained rise relative to assets over the
last three decades; corporate profits have seen a similar sustained rise relative to sales. Figure
1 shows the log of aggregate Tobin’s Q, the ratio of firm market value to firm assets, for the
nonfinancial corporate sector. The black line (smoothed and dashed) shows the log ratio of
aggregate firm value over firm assets from the US System of National Accounts.1 The gray
line shows the aggregate estimate of log Tobin’s Q for a large sample of publicly listed firms
described below.2 Both lines show a substantial rise in corporate valuations relative to
tangible assets since 1980. Figure 2 shows measures of current profit flows. The black line,
also drawn from the National Accounts, represents the ratio of the net operating surplus to
gross value added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the
ratio of aggregate operating income after depreciation to revenues for firms publicly listed in
the US. Again, both series show a substantial rise, in this case beginning around 1990.
Does this rise signal that US firms are extracting greater economic rents and, if so,
what does that imply for economic dynamism and inequality? The implications are
potentially troubling. A large literature associates regulatory rents with diminished dynamism
because of wasteful rent seeking (Tullock 1967, Posner 1975) that creates barriers to entry
(Olson 1982) or diverts talent from productive endeavors (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
1991). In addition, Stiglitz (2012) attributes much of the inequality in our economy to

Aggregate firm value (total liabilities + inventories – current assets) over firm assets (nonfinancial assets
excluding intellectual property products plus equity and investment fund shares) using data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, see http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Ni_FedBeaSna/Index.asp.
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Estimates of Tobin’s Q derived from firm microdata are typically higher than estimates derived from national
accounts because of accounting and other differences. See Piketty and Zucman (2014).

2

2

political rent seeking while Piketty (2014) sees rising corporate valuations leading to greater
wealth inequality and the rise of a rentier society.
Yet not all rents arise from political rent seeking activity nor do all rents imply social
waste. For example, firms can earn rents on innovations. These rents constitute an important
incentive to encourage investment in innovation. Generally, firms capture returns on
intangible investments as rents, that is, as supra-normal profits. This includes returns on
R&D, on “brand capital,” and on organizational investments.
This paper explores the roles of intangible investments and regulatory rents in
accounting for the recent rise of corporate valuations and profits. Finding an economically
substantial association between regulation and profits, I further explore the causal nature of
this link and I consider other factors such as changes in industry concentration.
Any attempt to understand the significance of economic rents must account for the
source and nature of the rents for several reasons. First, if economic rents simply reflect
returns to growing investments in new technology, they might signal greater economic
dynamism, not less.3 Similarly, to the extent that economic inequality arises from rents, the
nature of those rents matters. The rise in the capital share of corporate income (Figure 2)
corresponds to a fall in labor’s share of income, one indicator of inequality (Piketty 2014).
Again, the rise in markups might not be too troubling if it simply represents returns to
investments in technology.
Also, much of the increase in wage dispersion has been attributed to differences
between firms or between establishments (Song et al. 2015). Furman and Orszag (2015)
propose that rising corporate rents are shared with workers at affected firms, leading to
In patent race models (Loury 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980), R&D spending can, in some circumstances,
exceed the socially optimal level. But while such wasteful spending might not be socially optimal, it nevertheless
leads to increased dynamism, perhaps excessively so.

3

3

rising inter-firm wage differences. But if firm rents are rising primarily because of greater
investments in new technology, then pay might rise at those firms because of greater
demand for technology-specific skills. Indeed, Dunne et al. (2004) find that a significant
fraction of the growth in the dispersion of wages between plants is accounted for by
differences in plant investments in computer technology. The story clearly means something
different if firm rents are rising primarily because of regulatory capture.
Accounting for the sources of rents
Broadly, the aim of this paper is to account for the relative contributions of
corporate rents from three sources: returns on intangibles, industry concentration, and
government regulation. To do this accounting, I use a well-established empirical framework
for estimating the contribution of intangible investments to firm market value. Beginning
with Griliches (1981), numerous studies have used regressions on Tobin’s Q or firm market
value to estimate the economic value of intangibles including R&D (Cockburn and Griliches
1988; Hall 1993; Lev and Sougiannis 1996), advertising and marketing (Fullerton and Lyon
1988, Villalonga 2004), union rents (Salinger 1984), patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trachtenberg
2005; Bessen 2009), and organization capital (Lev and Radhakrishnan 2005; Eisfeldt and
Papanikolaou 2013). Using a large sample of firms listed on US public exchanges from 1970
through 2014, I use this approach to estimate the association between firm market values
and stocks of R&D, advertising and marketing expenditures, and organizational investments
measured via sales, general, and administrative expense. I also use a regression analysis to
test the relationship between firm operating margins and these intangibles.
This framework can be expanded to include measures of industry concentration and
government-created political rents. In the analysis below, I use standard measures of
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concentration such as the share of revenues going to the top four firms in 4-digit NAICS
industries.
Measuring regulatory rents
It is less obvious how to measure rents arising from governmental decisions. A
variety of government actions can generate rents. Sometimes government creates exclusive
markets for assets such as wireless spectrum or oil leases. Patents create market power, as do
entry barriers that arise from costly regulation (Dean and Brown 1995). Antitrust policy
affects industry concentration, rate setting in regulated markets can create rents, as do
government payments in the form of contracts, tax breaks, subsidies and bailouts.
I consider two approaches for gauging rents that arise from government regulation:
measuring investments in corporate political activity and measuring the extent of industryspecific regulation. Two measures of corporate political activity are lobbying expenditures
and election campaign contributions. De Figuieredo and Richter (2014) review the literature
on the impact of lobbying, finding effects across a wide range of policy areas. Another
literature explores the association between legislative voting and campaign contributions.
Ansolabehere, de Figuieredo, and Snyder (2003) review this literature, finding little evidence
that campaign contributions influence voting. They conclude that this spending might be
viewed primarily as a consumption good. However, legislative votes are only one channel
through which firms influence regulation; campaign spending and lobbying might also affect
the drafting of legislation (firms may benefit from the particular wording of laws), agency
rulemaking, rate setting, and other regulator actions. Other empirical research suggests that
some corporate political activity is directed to benefit managers rather than the firm, that is,
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there is an agency problem (Hochberg et al. 2009; Yu and Yu 2011; Werner and Coleman,
2015).
Yet a variety of evidence shows numerous ways that rent seeking activities seem to
pay for the firm. Case studies have found that corporate political activity is associated with
favorable tax treatment (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009; Alexander, Mazza,
and Scholz 2009), regulatory rate setting (Bonardi et al., 2006), tariffs (Mayda et al., 2010),
government contracts (Goldman et al., 2013), and bailouts (Duchin and Sosyura 2012).
Moreover, recent research finds associations between corporate valuations and profits and
measures of lobbying activity and corporate campaign contributions (Cooper, Gulen, and
Ovtchinnikov 2010; Hill et al. 2013; Chen, Parsley, and Yang 2015), including possibly
corrupt activity (Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016). However, Hadani and Schuler (2012)
find a negative relationship between corporate political activity and firm market
performance. Moreover, this literature has largely not explored the causal relationship
between corporate political activity and firm performance; an exception is Werner and
Roberts (2015) who use an instrumental variable estimation.
In any case, while campaign spending and lobbying expenditures might be useful
measures of rent seeking activity, they are likely incomplete measures of the ability of firms
to earn rents from government for several reasons. First, reporting requirements have
changed over time as well as the restrictions on spending.4 Second, most firms do not spend
in either category.5 This does not mean, however, that most firms do not earn government-

The requirements on reporting of campaign spending and spending limits have been affected by a number of
agency and legislative changes as well as Supreme Court decisions affecting campaign spending; data on
lobbying was only reported following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.

4

In the Compustat sample of publicly listed firms in 2014, 18% spent on lobbying while 11% made PAC
campaign contributions. In addition to being incomplete, this raises concerns about selection bias.
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created rents. The full range of rent seeking activities is much broader than US campaign
spending and the use of registered lobbyists: firms pursue favorable decisions from
regulators on rate setting or leases on Federal property or tax treatments, they challenge
regulatory rules and decisions in court, they make extensive investments in order to gain
regulatory approval (e.g., clinical drug trials), they hire former regulators, and they may make
major changes in business strategy in order to capture regulatory rents (Posner 1975).
Moreover, firms pursue rents not only from the US Federal government, but also from state,
local, and foreign jurisdictions. Finally, even if we could measure all of these rent-seeking
activities, these are only inputs to rent generation; firms may earn rents from government
actions even when these rents are not the direct result of the affected firm’s political activity.
The complexity of regulation
Ideally, we would like to measure the rent-generating potential of government
regulations affecting different industries. I propose that the extent or complexity of
regulation might reflect its rent-generating potential. Below I describe Regdata (Al-Ubaydli
and McLaughlin 2015), a data source that provides industry-weighted word counts for each
part and title of the Code of Federal Regulations for each year. These data might proxy for
the rent-generating potential of regulation and hence might serve to capture the extent to
which the rise in firm profits is associated with government regulation.
Whether these data actually serve this purpose, however, is an empirical question.
There are theoretical reasons both for and against my proposed use.6 There are two reasons
why more complex regulation might be associated with greater rents. First, regulation might
become more complex as firms exert greater effort at rent seeking. At least since Mancur

6

See Peltzman (1989) for an overview of the theory of regulation.
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Olson (1982, pp. 69-73), economists have identified several reasons why growing complexity
might reflect rent seeking:7 rent seekers might exact special provisions and exceptions to
regulations; because the general public has limited interest, special interests may succeed with
more complex regulation; regulation may become more complex as firms find loopholes or
ways to evade prior regulation, requiring new regulation. In all these cases, significant
potential rents would encourage firms to contest the regulations aggressively, expanding the
extent of regulation and making it a proxy for rent seeking effort.
Second, the complexity of regulation might itself facilitate rent extraction (McCarty
2013, Drutman 2015). For example, more complex regulation might make regulators more
dependent on industry knowledge and expertise, facilitating industry influence. More
complex regulation can serve as an entry barrier, providing rents to incumbents and larger
firms (Nitzan, Procaccia, and Tzur 2013).8
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that more extensive regulation might
be associated with lower rents. In one view, regulators develop new regulations in order to fix
market failures (as in Pigou 1920), including monopoly rents. Also, the “tollbooth” view of
regulation (McChesney 1987; Djankov et al. 2002) sees regulation imposing costs on industry
for the benefit of bureaucrats and politicians; that is, regulators extract rents earned by firms.
In this account, regulation also decreases rents, but with different motivation.
While these different views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do imply that
regulation and rents could be either positively or negatively correlated. Incorporating this

7

See also Kearl 1983; Quandt 1983; Krueger and Duncan 1993.

For example, Philip Morris supported legislation to regulate tobacco by the FDA, perhaps in order to gain an
advantage against smaller rivals and potential entrants (James Flanigan, “Philip Morris' Tactic: FDA
Regulation,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2001). The evidence on whether regulation tends to reduce entry in
general is mixed. See Goldschlag and Tabarrok (2016) but also Bailey and Thomas (2015).
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index of regulation into the regression analysis along with measures of campaign spending
and lobbying expenditures, I find that all are positively associated with Tobin’s Q and firm
operating margins but the association with the regulation index is particularly significant.
However, this association must be interpreted carefully because it is not clear which way
causality flows. As above, regulators might develop new regulations in order to fix market
failures, including monopoly rents. In this case, regulations would be developed in response
to economic rents rather than creating rents. To distinguish between these two effects, I also
conduct several causality tests below.

Estimation strategy
Specification
Viewing firm value as the present value of future profits, Hayashi (1982) provides a
formal model relating firm value to the current value of capital stocks. Hayashi and Inoue
(1991) and Hall (1993) extend this model to multiple capital stocks that might include both
tangible capital and stocks of intangibles. I use a simplified variation of their models and
include stocks of not only capitalized investments in productive intangibles, but also
capitalized investments in rent seeking.
I assume that profits are a function of an aggregate capital stock for firm j at time t
(1)

𝐾!" =

! 𝛾! 𝑘!"# ,

where the 𝛾! coefficients represent the relative profit-generating potential of different types
of capital stocks, 𝑘!"# (Hall 1993). Let i=0 represent tangible capital and normalize 𝛾! = 1.
Assuming for simplicity that firms optimize variable inputs at each point in time, the
production function has constant returns to scale, and there are adjustment costs to
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investment, then Tobin’s Q, defined as firm market value over the current value of tangible
capital, is equal to (see Appendix),
(2)

𝑄!" ≡ !

!!"

!! !!!"

!

!

= 𝑞! 1 + 𝛾! !!!" + 𝛾! !!!" + ⋯ .
!!"

!!"

Where V is firm value and p is the user cost of capital. Hayashi calls the variable 𝑞!
“marginal q;” it is assumed to be approximately equal to 1 and, given competitive capital
markets, it is equal across firms at any given time.
This simple equation captures two intuitions. One intuition is Tobin’s original insight
that the market value of a firm is related to the replacement cost of its assets. In a
competitive market, firms will add capacity (either new entrants or existing firms) at the
replacement cost of capital, driving prices down until, in long run equilibrium, the
discounted stream of expected future profits (market value) equals the cost of those assets.
However, because of adjustment costs, the long run equilibrium is not reached immediately.
Instead, marginal q differs from unity, exceeding 1 when the capital stock is below the
equilibrium level, less than 1 when there is excess capacity. Marginal q captures variation in
firm value associated with the business cycle and also with shocks such as globalization. The
second intuition is that intangibles and favorable regulation create supra-normal profits
reflected in a market value that exceeds that of a competitive firm.
I assume that disturbances are multiplicative so that, taking logarithms,
(3)

!

!

log 𝑄!" = log 1 + 𝛾! !!!" + 𝛾! !!!" + ⋯ +
!!"

!!"

! 𝛿!

∙ 𝐼 𝑡 = 𝑇 + 𝜀!"# ,
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where I is an indicator function. I estimate this equation using nonlinear least squares.9 The
coefficients 𝛾! tell us about the relative importance of the different capital stocks for
generating profits.
However, other factors could contribute to a sustained rise in profits in some
industries. Firms might have greater market power in more concentrated industries,
generating sustained higher profits. Although regulation might create market power as noted
above, other independent factors might also create market power that could raise Tobin’s Q
such as changes in antitrust policy, financial innovations facilitating mergers, or new
technologies that generate strong network effects. To test for these possibilities I include an
industry concentration measure in some estimates. Also, investors might demand higher risk
premiums for more volatile companies, rewarding them with lower stock prices. Declining
volatility might also contribute to rising values of Tobin’s Q. I also estimate specifications
including a measure of stock volatility below.
A comparable regression can be found using firm operating margins as the
dependent variable. Because corporate valuations reflect investors’ expectations of future
profits, current profits should exhibit similar associations with intangibles and regulation,
albeit possibly with higher standard errors. Assuming a linear homogeneous profit function
(see Appendix), current profits can be written as the sum of returns on the various capital
stocks,
!"

𝜋!" = !"

! 𝛾! 𝑘!"# ,

See Hall (1993) and Bessen (2009) for discussion of other specifications. Note that the Taylor series
approximation of log (1 + 𝑥) ≈ 𝑥 for 𝑥 ≈ 0 does not work well for the data here because the implied values
of x are too large.
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recognizing that the rate of return on the aggregate stock will change over time. Using time
dummies and adding an error term, operating margins can then be written as
(4)

!!"
!!"

=

!!"#
! 𝛽! !
!"

+

! 𝛿!

∙ 𝐼 𝑡 = 𝑇 + 𝜀!"# .

This equation can be estimated using OLS.

Data
Sample
The main sample consists of Compustat firms traded on US exchanges between
1970 and 2014. I exclude firms that are missing data on market value, sales, and assets. For
the regression analyses shown in the paper, I also exclude the 1 percent tails of the
dependent variable to counter measurement error at the extremes.
The calculation of Tobin’s Q requires estimating the replacement cost of the firm’s
capital. For non-financial firms this estimate is based substantially on the firm’s investments
in plant and equipment. Many financial firms do not report plant and equipment and the
meaning of their capital assets is mainly financial in any case. I exclude these financial firms
from the Tobin’s Q analysis, leaving a sample of 193,148 firm-year observations in an
unbalanced panel; financial firms are included in the analysis of operating margins.
Because regulation data is central to the analysis, I also restrict the sample to firms in
industries that are assigned a regulation index. As described below, the sections of the Code
of Federal Regulation are assigned weights for different industries using a computer
algorithm. In some cases, sampling variance makes the industry match unreliable and the
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industry is not assigned a regulation index in Regdata.10 At the 3-digit industry level, 31% of
the firm-year observations lack a regulation index. In the analysis reported below, I exclude
these observations, leaving a sample of 133,198. I repeated the regressions including them
but coding the regulation index to zero. The results were quite similar except that the
coefficient of the regulation variable was attenuated, as expected.
For the regressions on firm operating margins, I include the financial firms.
However, for these analyses I thought it appropriate to exclude startups that are in a
predominately research phase, prior to meaningful “regular” sales. I excluded firm where
research and development costs exceeded half of net revenues, leaving a sample of 135,968
firm-year observations.
Variables
Key variables are defined as follows:
The market value of the firm consists of the sum of all the claims on the firm, namely,
the sum of the value of the common stock, the preferred stock (valued by dividing the
preferred dividend by Moody’s Index of Medium Risk Preferred Stock Yields), long term
debt adjusted for inflation, and short term debt net of current assets. While the market value
of short-term debt is assumed to equal its book value, the market value of long-term debt
depends on the age structure of the debt and the change in interest rates over time. I use the
method of and Brainard et al. (1980) to estimate the market value of long-term debt.
The value of assets is the sum of the net value of plant and equipment, inventories,
accounting intangibles, and investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries adjusted for inflation.

Specifically, the creators of Regdata use an algorithmic classifier including industries where the classifier has
an ROC AUC score greater than or equal to 0.75 in 5-fold cross validation.

10

13

I calculate the replacement value of plant and equipment using the method of the method of
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) using the NIPA investment deflator.11 Note that financial
firms often do not include plant and equipment on their balance sheets; these firms are
excluded from the Tobin’s Q regression, but are included in the regressions on operating
profits.
The various capital stocks are calculated using the perpetual inventory method with
deflators to calculate current value stocks. Following the literature, I assign a depreciation
rate and pre-sample growth rate to each series. Robustness checks show that the estimated
marginal effects are not sensitive to the particular choice of these rates. The R&D stock is
calculated assuming a 15% annual depreciation rate and an 8% pre-sample growth rate (Hall
1990); R&D expenditures are deflated using an R&D deflator. The advertising stock is based
on advertising and marketing expenditures and assumes a 45% annual depreciation rate and
5% pre-sample growth rate (Villalonga 2004, p. 217). The “organizational capital” stock is
calculated using sales, general, and administrative expenditure (SGA), assuming a 15%
depreciation rate and a 6% pre-sample growth rate. Note that these expenditures include
advertising and marketing spending. They also typically include spending on IT services and
most inhouse software development. Both expenditures are deflated using the GDP deflator.
Financial statements do not report R&D, advertising, or SGA when the quantities
are not material to the financial results of the firm. In these cases, the quantities might still
be positive, but small. In the regressions, I code missing data for these variables to zero but I
include a dummy variable flagging the missing data.

Thanks to Bronwyn Hall for providing Stata code to compute this. The code was developed by Bronwyn and
Daehwan Kim.
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The lobbying and campaign expenditure data come from the Center for Responsive
Politics.12 For each data set, I matched the company name (the client parent entity in the
lobbying data, the short name of the political action committee for business PACs in the
expenditure data) to Compustat companies.13 The lobbying data begin in 1998; the campaign
expenditure data are assigned to the election year beginning in 2000. I assumed a 25%
depreciation rate and a 6% pre-sample growth rate for each and deflated both using the
GDP deflator.
To measure industry concentration, I use data from the US Economic Census for the
share of receipts going to the top four firms in each NAICS industry.14 I used the Census
data for 2002 and 2012, interpolating and extrapolating linearly from 2000 through 2014. In
order to measure concentration over the entire sample time frame, I also developed an
alternative measure based on the share of 3-digit SIC industry revenues reported in
Compustat going to the top three firms in Compustat.15
To measure stock volatility, I measure the annual standard deviation in firm daily stock
returns reported in the data of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Regulation index
The final key variable is the index of industry-weighted regulatory constraints
developed by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015). Prior researchers have measured
regulatory complexity using page counts, word counts, or file sizes of the text of the Federal
12

Data downloaded from http://www.opensecrets.org/resources/create/data_doc.php.

For the lobbying data, of the 19,359 entities (companies, unions, trade associations, other organizations),
11% were matched to Compustat firms; these firms accounted for 53% of all lobbying expenditures. Of the
3,720 PACs, 38% were matched to Compustat, accounting for 54% of all expenditures.

13

In Compustat, firms are assigned to NAICS at different levels of industry detail, from 2-digit to 6-digit. I
matched to the concentration ratio for each level of detail. I also used an SIC to NAICS walkway for firms that
listed SIC industries, but not NAICS.
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Details and results available from author.
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Register or Code of Federal Regulations (Coglianese 2002; Mulligan & Shleifer 2005;
Dawson & Seater 2013; Crews 2011; Coffey et al. 2012). This new index improves on these
measures by linking the titles and parts of the code to specific industries. Al-Ubaydli and
McLaughlin use an algorithm to probabilistically assign each section of the Code to a specific
NAICS industry. They do this assignment for sets of 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit NAICS
industries. The result is a time series of the extent of regulation for specific industries since
1970.
For example, Figure 3 shows the series for Title 12, Banks and Banking, weighted for
NAICS 522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities. This figure clearly shows
deregulation during the 1980s and later jumps in the extent of regulation in 1991 and 2010
and after. These latter increases were associated with Truth in Lending regulations following
the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, the Home Equity Loan Consumer
Protection Act of 1988, and the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008. Further large
increases after 2010 are associated with the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.
While this regulation index is not a capital stock per se, it can be incorporated into
equations (3) and (4) in a way parallel to the capital stocks above. An intangible capital stock
generates rents in proportion to the size of the stock. To the extent that regulations create
market power, the absolute measure of rents generated should be proportional to firm
revenues, all else equal. That is, an oligopoly markup of prices over cost would benefit all
firms in an industry in proportion to their revenues.16 I thus measure the rent-generating
potential of regulation for a firm as the regulation index for a given year times firm revenues.

Some rents might take the form of lump sum distributions. Comparing a specification of this form (not
scaled), the explanatory power of the scaled specification is superior.
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I use 3-digit NAICS weighted word counts from Regdata version 2.2. The 3-digit data
provide coverage for most of the Compustat sample (69%).
Summary statistics
Sample means, weighted by net capital in order to represent aggregate ratios, are
shown in Table 1 at three different dates. Tobin’s Q increased sharply from 1970 to 2000
and declined modestly since then. A similar pattern is seen in the R&D and advertising
stocks. The SGA stock shows a secular decline while the regulation stock shows a large
secular increase. Since 2000, industry concentration and lobbying stocks have increased;
campaign spending has increased dramatically. However, both lobbying and election
spending quantities are quite small compared to the other stocks measured. Finally, the
regulation index shows strong growth, increasing nearly six-fold since 1970.

Accounting for firm profits
Accounting for Tobin’s Q
Table 2 shows estimates of equation (3). I estimate the equation using Non-linear
Least Squares with robust standard errors clustered by major industry group.17 All
regressions include year dummies, as per equation (3) that are not reported. For observations
missing data in the R&D, advertising, and SGA variables, I coded the variable to zero and
included a dummy variable to flag the missing data.
The first column uses only the stocks of intangible assets. These all have highly
significant coefficients. The bottom panel of the table shows the extent to which the

Using firm SIC codes, I classified firms into major industry groups according to the 9 major divisions of the
SIC hierarchy with two additional groups for chemicals and pharma (SIC 28) and for tech (SIC 357, 367, and
737).
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coefficients can account for the change in log Q. I take the difference between the sample
mean of the independent variable between the end and beginning of the sample period.
These means are weighted by net capital in order to capture the impact on aggregate log Q. I
multiply the difference in means by 100 times the coefficient to present the impact in
percentages. As can be seen, growth in intangibles “explain” about one sixth of the rise in
Tobin’s Q from 1970 to 2014. R&D and advertising had a positive impact, but SGA had a
negative impact.
Column 2 adds the regulation variable. The coefficient is significant and the implied
impact on log Q is substantial. Combined, the regression variables account for nearly half of
the rise in Tobin’s Q.
Column 3 adds the volatility of the firm’s common stock and the measure of
industry concentration derived from Compustat data. Volatility tends to reduce firm value
while industry concentration increases it. But neither effect is large and the industry
concentration coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that the substantial
association between regulation and firm value is not explained by these measures of industry
concentration. It could be that this concentration measure does not pick up the relevant
effect of market power, for example, the relevant market might be much narrower than the
3-digit industry classification.
The regulation variable is an industry specific measure; most of the variation in
industry restrictions is cross-sectional rather than time based. It is possible that the
coefficient on the regulation variable might reflect some other industry specific variable that
is omitted from the regression. To control for omitted industry specific effects, column 4
adds dummy variables for major industry group. Compared with column 2, the dummy
variables improve the R-squared modestly and decrease the coefficient on regulation
18

modestly, leaving it statistically significant only at the 10% level (P = .054). But the overall
impression is that the regulation coefficient does not seem to be mainly reflecting some
omitted industry specific variable. I will test this further below with a difference-indifferences specification.
Finally, column 5 adds the industry concentration ratio from the Economic Census
and also stocks for lobbying and campaign expenditures. Because these data are only
available for more recent years, this regression only covers from year 2000 through 2014. As
in column 3, the industry concentration measure is positive but neither economically nor
statistically significant.
The lobbying coefficient is highly significant while the campaign-spending coefficient
is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on both are much larger than one,
suggesting that these investments appear to generate much larger returns than investments in
plant and equipment. The high level of returns has been noted in the literature (Alexander,
Mazza, and Scholz 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010; Hill et al. 2013; Chen,
Parsley, and Yang 2015).18 Hill et al. (2013, p. 955) propose that various frictions might
constrain the extent to which firms lobby so that they cannot increase spending until the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Another explanation is that lobbying and
campaign spending comprise only a small part of firms’ investments in rent seeking. These
variables serve as proxies for much more extensive investments and, so, their coefficients are
inflated. This interpretation is supported by the large role played by the regulation variable,

A case study by Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz (2009) found that one dollar in lobbying expense returned
$220 in tax savings. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) report that “in our sample, firms invest an
average total contribution amount per year of $23,471 and earn an average increase in shareholder wealth of
$163.8M per year.”

18

19

which might reflect other rent seeking investments. The impact of regulation is larger than
the impact of the other political variables combined.
Overall, the relative contributions of the different variables to the change in Tobin’s
Q changed after 2000. The variables representing intangible investments tended to decline
while the political variables increased.
Accounting for operation margins
Table 3 shows four similar regressions on operating margins (operating income after
depreciation before interest and taxes divided by net revenues). These are estimated using
weighted least squares where the weights are deflated sales so that the results reflect
aggregate profit margins. Here the independent variables are beginning-of-year stocks (that
is, lagged stocks) divided by sales. As before, missing data on intangibles are coded to zero.19
The right hand variables include R&D, advertising, SGA, lobbying, and election campaigns. I
also include the regulation index and the net capital stock divided by sales, in order to
capture returns on tangible capital as well. The bottom panel of shows the effect on the
change in operating margins for each independent variable calculated at the sample means as
in Table 2.
The first two columns in the top panel cover the entire period (less the first year,
dropped for lagged variables). The first column excludes political variables and, as in the
previous table, these account for about one sixth of the growth in operating margins.
Column two adds the regulation index. Both intangibles and regulation have statistically
significant and economically substantial effects on operating margins, especially regulation.

Because operating profit is calculated by subtracting expenditures from revenues, I use lagged variables
because any measurement error will spuriously cause a negative correlation. In addition some time lag naturally
arises before many of these investments pay off.
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Regulation accounts for over half of the increase in operating margins. The third column
includes the political variables. Because campaign spending is assigned to election years, this
regression covers only odd years from 2001 through 2013. Campaign spending has a large
and statistically significant impact. During this period, however, the contribution of
intangibles was negative because spending declined in these categories. In contrast, spending
increased on political activities and the regulation index also grew.
The bottom panel takes a deeper look into regulation; it repeats the regression in
column two, but breaks out the regulation index into component indices for the top ten
titles in the CFR plus a category for the remaining titles. The top ten titles account for 73%
of the regulation words across the entire sample and most of the variation in the composite
index. This regression also adds major industry dummy variables and clusters errors by major
industry. The regulation coefficients are jointly highly significant and can more than
“explain” the growth in operating margins. But clearly there is substantial heterogeneity
across regulatory areas. Banking, the tax code, environmental regulation, and the remainder
category all have substantial positive effects on firm profits on average; aerospace and
Federal contracting regulations have a negative effect.
In summary, the growth of intangibles and the growth of regulation and political rent
seeking activities are substantially associated with the rise in corporate valuations and
operating profits. However, since 2000, investments in intangibles have declined relative to
tangible capital while regulation and election spending have continued to increase. Thus
political variables “explain” much of the rise in profits and corporate valuations since 2000.
Finally, the rents generated by regulation appear to be concentrated in a few areas of
regulation and, hence, in a few industries, most notably banking, securities, and chemical
manufacture, including pharmaceuticals.
21

Causality Tests
However, this is only an accounting exercise. While greater regulation is associated
with higher profits and valuations, this exercise does not necessarily imply that greater
regulation caused the rise in profits and valuations. In fact, there might be good reasons why
the causality could flow from higher profits to greater regulation. In the public interest
account, regulation aims to correct market failures. Sustained corporate market power might
be an indication of a market failure, providing a target for regulators. Historically, for
example, large profits by monopolists encouraged “trust-busting” by Progressive reformers.
Also, both profits and regulation might grow in response to some third factor. For
example, major new technologies could bring profits and existing industries might seek new
regulation to limit the effects of new technology. In this case it would be a mistake to
assume that the regulatory rent seeking caused the profits.
This section performs several tests of the causal link between regulation and
corporate valuations and profits.
Granger causality
Granger causality (1969) provides a baseline test. This procedure tests whether
lagged values of an independent variable have explanatory power beyond the lagged values
of the dependent variable. Because the linear form of equation (4) lends itself to the analysis,
I examine the causality regarding operating margins.20
Table 4 shows these regressions for the composite regulation index (top panel) and
tests for the joint significance of the relevant coefficients in the bottom panel for both the
composite index and separately for major title of the CFR.

20

In addition, Tobin’s Q analysis excludes financial firms, an important sector for this analysis.
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The table shows that profits do not Granger-causes regulation, except for Title 21,
Food and Drug regulations. But regulation does Granger-cause operating margins, although
not with high significance for the non-enumerated titles.
This finding is sufficient to reject the simple reverse causality story; if high profits
caused regulators to act, then regulation would reflect lagged profits. However, Granger
causality does not mean that regulation causes increased profits in the normal sense of
causation. For instance, both profits and regulation might be caused by some third factor,
yet regulation might respond more rapidly than profits, so that regulation would have
explanatory power before profits. Such an explanation is possible, but the slow nature of
regulatory change makes this sort of explanation seem unlikely. As noted, the regulatory
approval process has built-in delays. In contrast, firms are generally assumed to respond
quickly to profit opportunities. If some third factor is driving both new regulations and
corporate profits, it seems hard to see how typically slow regulators would be able to
respond several years before firms do.
Major regulatory changes
This Granger analysis considers all regulatory changes affecting the sample industries
over three decades. Most regulatory changes are relatively small. It is possible, however, that
firms and political actors behave differently when major regulatory changes are at stake.
This might be the case, for instance, if public advocacy faces a collective action
problem (Olson 1965). Those industries most affected by regulations will have the greatest
incentive to invest in rent seeking, tending to dominate the ordinary process of regulation, all
else equal. Other interests that are less directly affected have greater difficulty organizing
collective action because the individual rewards are lower. Occasionally, however, broad
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coalitions of opposing interests may be motivated to act, they may overcome their collective
action problem, and when they do, one might expect major regulatory changes to follow.
If this view is correct, then major regulatory changes might be relatively more
affected by public interests that act in response to corporate market power. It might be the
case that major regulatory changes are influenced by prior corporate profits even if that is
not the case in general as suggested by the Granger analysis above.
To consider this possibility, I conducted a Probit analysis of the factors associated
with major changes in regulation, including lagged operating margins. I then conducted a
difference-in-differences analysis to see if these large changes in regulation in select
industries led to profit increases relative to a control group. I began by identifying the
industries most affected by major changes for each of the top ten Titles of the CFR. I
identified the 3-digit NAICS industry that had the highest number of weighted words for
each Title. For example, NAICS 522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities, was the
industry most affected by Title 12, Banks and Banking. The full list of affected industries can
be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Next I needed to choose those years where the weighted number of words for each
Title:industry pair increased substantially; these are presumably the events where the impact
of regulatory change should be most visible.21 I needed to choose a threshold so that an
industry might have a few events during the sample period, but not so many that the effect
of one event tended to overlap other events.22 To do this, I first used a threshold of 100,000
for the year-to-year difference in weighted words, excluding cases where a similar event
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I study decreases in a separate paper on deregulation.

I tested a variety of alternative thresholds. While some created problems with overlapping events, the
estimates I obtain below appeared robust to these choices.
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occurred during the prior three years; this yielded seventeen events in six Titles. Then I
repeated the process for the four remaining Titles, using a threshold of 50,000. This left a
total of 24 events, covering all ten Titles (see Table A1).
Finally, I explored the regulatory history of each change to understand the nature of
the changes.23 Some of the changes were not substantive changes in regulation; for example,
the FDA recodified Title 21 in 1974, leading to changes in word counts, but not real change
in the law. Other major changes were not primarily relevant to the selected industry; in
particular, we could not identify the industry-specific sections for changes in the income tax
code (Title 26, Part 1). For these two reasons, I designated a sub-sample where documentary
evidence suggests that the change in regulation was substantive and it affected the designated
industry.
The first question to address with this dataset of major regulatory changes is whether
firm operating margins tend to increase the probability of a major regulatory change. Table 5
shows Probit regressions on the occurrence of a major regulatory change. The sample
consists of all firm-year observations from the industries that experience major changes.24 All
regressions include year dummies and dummies for major industry groups. The first two
columns include all events, the last two columns, only those events that are judged
substantive to the affected industry. The coefficient for Log employment is statistically
significant and the industry dummy variables are jointly significant, but coefficients for
lagged operating margins are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant. In
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Thanks to Stefanie Weigmann for much of this analysis. See Table A1 for summaries.

Other industries are not paired with the top ten Titles and are thus excluded from the assignment of major
changes.
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summary, these tests reject the hypothesis that high profits are responsible for subsequent
major increases in regulation.
Difference-in-differences
In order to consider other possible causal interactions, I used these events of major
increases in regulation to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. Under the assumption
that the control and treatment groups share a common underlying trend aside from the
treatment, a difference-in-difference analysis compares the difference between the treatment
and control groups before and after the event. A simple way to estimate these differences is
with a regression of the form
(5) 𝑦! = 𝛼 ∙ 𝐼 treatment group + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼 post event + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐼 treatment & post + 𝜀! ,
where 𝑦! is the dependent variable and I is an indicator function designating a dummy
variable. The coefficient 𝛾 is the measure of the average treatment effect on the treated, the
difference-in-differences (DID).
For each firm in an industry affected by a major change, I constructed a panel
consisting of the three years prior to the change and three years after.25 These firms
constituted the treatment group. I constructed a basic control group by selecting firms in
industries that did not experience major regulatory change (a change of more than 10,000
words in either direction) during the year of the treatment event or during the preceding
three years or the following three years.
Table 6, column 1 shows the analysis for the entire sample of panels pooled for all
events, using operating margins as the dependent variable. During the pre-event period,
treatment firms had operating margins that were about 2% lower than the control group;
25

Keeping only those panels that had data for the third year before and after.
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after the event, treatment firms averaged operating margins were 4% higher, leaving a
difference-in-differences of about a 6% increase in profits. Because of concerns about serial
correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004), the standard errors are block
bootstrapped by firm using 200 repetitions. This increase is statistically significant.
The critical assumption is that the treatment and control groups follow the same
trend between the pre- and post-periods so that in the counterfactual case without treatment,
the difference in differences would be zero. While this assumption cannot be directly tested,
it can be thrown into doubt if the treatment and control groups exhibit different trends before
the event. I estimated the trend as the change between three years before the event and the
year before. The difference in the pre-event trend was large (.14), although not statistically
significant.
Column 2 repeats these calculations but only for those events judged to be
substantive. Now profits increased by 8% in the treatment group relative to the control
group; the pre-event trend difference was also smaller. Column 3 uses a different control
group, namely all Compustat firms. These results are similar to column 2.
Column 4 uses the original control group but adds controls for tangible and
intangible assets. I do this by regressing operating income on these variable (and time
dummies) as in Table 3, Column 1, and using the residuals from this regression as the
dependent variable in the DID analysis. The residual is effectively a measure of excess
profits. Now treatment group profits increase about 6% relative to the control group and the
pre-event trend difference is negligible. Finally, column 5 does the same analysis, but weights
the observations with a kernel-based propensity score (Heckman et al. 1998); that score is
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based on a Probit regression using log employment and industry dummy variables as in
Table 5.26 These results are close to those in column 4.
This table presents the results for pooled panels. Table A1 in the Appendix shows
results for separate events, using residuals for the dependent variable. Of the 15 substantive
changes, 12 have positive coefficients. However, the role of Title 12 and the banking
industry seems particularly strong. Repeating the regression in column 4 but excluding Title
12, the DID estimate is smaller at 3.8%, but still highly significant (standard error of 1.3%).
One might also be concerned about the effect of the recent recession. Excluding events after
2008, the DID estimate is 4.1% (standard error of 1.3%).
In summary, firms in industries experiencing a major increase in regulation saw
significantly increased profits relative to control groups and this finding seems robust to
several considerations.

Discussion
What does regulation do?
The empirical findings suggest that increases in the complexity of regulation are
causally associated with increased firm profits in the affected industries. These results are
difficult to reconcile with the idea that firm profits induce greater regulation. They are also
difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that a third factor such as technology increases both
regulatory complexity and firm profits—the timing for this story requires that the impact of
the technological or other change occurs in exactly the year that the final rule is issued, yet
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new regulation is usually years in the making, often involving new legislation, multiple
proposed rules, and, sometimes, legal challenges (see Table A1).
This analysis does not, however, explain how the profits associated with regulation
are created. The possibilities include government grants of exclusive assets such as wireless
spectrum or oil leases, the creation of entry barriers, either explicit (patents) or as an indirect
of costly regulation, regulatory rate setting, and government contracts, tax breaks, subsidies,
and bailouts. Some insight can be gained by looking at a case study.
Crawford (2000) analyzes one of the events included in the difference-in-differences
analysis. In response to concerns that excessive cable television prices reflected monopoly
rents, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 “to provide increased consumer protection.” The FCC promulgated extensive new
regulations the next year. Given this background, one might expect that these regulations
reduced cable TV profits. Indeed, this is what regulators supposed; the Federal
Communications Commission estimated that cable prices would fall 10%, saving households
over $1 billion (FCC 1993). As such, this account seems to correspond to the public interest
view that regulators respond to needs of the public; it also corresponds to the tollbooth view
in so far as regulators took actions that might extract rents from firms (McChesney 1987;
Djankov et al. 2002).
However, households did not benefit from the new regulation overall. Crawford
(2000) shows that the actual realized prices did not fall and about one third of households
actually paid more.27 How did this happen? The complex regulations provided cable
companies with substantial latitude to evade the price decreases by changing programming

In the difference-in-differences analysis, the profit residuals increased relative to the control group, but the
increase is not statistically significant (see Appendix Table A1).
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mix and quality. The cable companies did reduce fees on their basic packages, but they also
cut the programming provided in those packages, shifting desired programs to more costly
bundles. In addition to influencing the details of this legislation and regulation, the cable
companies engaged in substantial market-based rent seeking activity by changing their
offerings.
Thus the complexity of regulation appears to have created the opportunity for firms
to earn greater rents despite the consumerist, anti-competitive intent of the legislation. This
might seem consistent with Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulation that “as a rule, regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” However,
this example does not seem to be an instance of captured regulators; the regulators aimed to
lower cable prices, contrary to what the industry wanted, and they expected the regulation to
reduce firm profits.28 Instead, the mechanism seems to be a sort of systemic capture
facilitated by regulatory complexity (McCarty 2013, Drutman 2015).
Regulation and rent seeking
While the difference-in-differences analysis implies that more extensive regulation
increases firm profits, it also does not explain what causes the increase in regulation.
Corporate political activity such as lobbying might cause the increase, but that is not
necessarily so. For instance, regulation might increase because technologies are getting more
complicated. For example, new automotive safety technology appeared to provide a reason
for increases in the size of transportation regulation in Title 49. On the other hand, lobbying

Indeed, in response to an earlier account of this research, one of the 1993 FCC Commissioners posted an
online comment consistent with the record that “Our agency was not captured. Indeed, the industry vilified
me” Marginal Revolution, 6/15/2016, http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/06/regulationand-rents.html.
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might also play a role in the development of these complex new regulations—lobbying and
political spending are correlated with regulation.29 Given that greater regulation appears
responsible for a sizeable part of the increase in firm profits, it would be puzzling if firms did
not lobby or pursue other forms of rent seeking when faced with new regulation.30 Thus,
while regulation helps profits, the link between regulation and corporate political activity
appears complicated.

Conclusion
Much of the growth in corporate valuations and profits since 1980 can be accounted
for by growing investments in intangibles, especially investment in R&D. But it appears that
an even larger share of the rise in valuations and profits can be accounted for by factors
associated with growing regulation and political activity, especially after 2000. Moreover, this
relationship appears causal: increases in regulatory complexity appear to cause subsequent
increases in profits.
And these benefits appear to be large. Regulation corresponds to an increase in
corporate valuations of about $2 trillion in the sample (Table 2, Column 2). Regulation and
campaign spending are responsible for an increase in markups on the order of 1-2 percent
(Table 3, Column 2). That corresponds to about a $400 billion increase in transfers from
consumers to firms each year.
Several qualifications affect the interpretation of these findings. First, regulatory
rents are not substantial in most industries; they are highly concentrated in a small number

Aggregating lobbying and campaign expenditures across 3-digit NAICS industries, the correlations with the
total number of regulatory words weighted by industry relevance have coefficients of 0.63 and 0.33
respectively.
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For instance, the regulation index is also correlated with the share of lawyers in an industry’s workforce
(correlation coefficient of 0.44 excluding legal firms).
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of industries. This has implications for the dispersion of firm profits that might be related to
rising inter-firm wage inequality.
Second, this study only looks at publicly listed firms. The effect of regulation might
be quite different on private firms, especially small firms. Indeed, if rents are created via
barriers to entry, one might expect large firms to benefit and small firms to be harmed.
This raises an additional limitation. While this study finds a large, causal effect from
regulation, it does not identify the actual mechanism at work. Nor does it identify the exact
role of corporate political activity. These are important for understanding the implications of
the rise in regulatory rents, their normative significance, and possible policy responses.
Despite these limitations, the findings highlight the importance of looking at the link
between regulation and rents broadly:
•

Some observers have highlighted the possible role of increasing industry

concentration in generating economic rents (Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely 2015, CEA
2016). Using two different measures of concentration, I find only a weak relationship
with profits that is neither statistically nor economically significant. Regulation may be
more important than industry concentration in generating rents and, for that reason,
market power may be more than a matter for antitrust policy alone.
•

Compliance costs of regulation might be beneficial to some firms. Despite possibly

substantial compliance costs (Crews 2011), complex regulation is associated with greater
profits among public firms, perhaps because compliance costs create entry barriers.
•

As in the cable TV example, regulatory complexity can generate rents even when

individual regulators are not “captured” or even “culturally captured” (Kwak 2013).
While the corruption or biasing of individual regulators is surely important, the role of
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complexity highlights the importance of a systemic notion of capture (McCarty 2013,
Drutman 2015).
•

While I have linked regulatory complexity to firm profits, the link between corporate

political activity and regulatory complexity is unclear and might well involve multiple
paths of causation. Moreover, corporate rent-seeking likely involves much more than
lobbying and campaign contributions.
Thus although regulation appears central to understanding the link between politics
and corporate rents, many questions remain unanswered.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Year

1970

2000

2014

Log Tobin’s Q

0.140

0.460

0.344

Industry weighted regulation words (million)

0.360

1.330

2.135

R&D stock / net capital

0.060

0.116

0.108

Advertising stock / net capital

0.004

0.018

0.014

SGA stock / net capital

0.742

0.628

0.615

Standard deviation, daily stock market returns

0.021

0.031

0.014

Four-firm share of receipts

0.429

0.438

Lobbying stock x 1000 / net capital

0.168

0.204

Election spending stock x 1000 / net capital

0.001

0.017

3776

2456

Number of firms

1445

Note: sample means weighted by net capital.
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Table 2. Log Tobin’s Q Regressions
2

3

4

Independent Variables

1970 - 2014

1

1970 - 2014

1970 - 2014

1970 - 2014

2000 - 2014

R&D stock / net capital
Advertising stock / net
capital
SGA stock / net capital
Regulation index / net
capital
Compustat 3 firm
concentration ratio

0.738 (.129)**

0.772 (.134)**

0.883 (.148)**

0.735 (.120)**

0.567 (.104)**

0.600 (.171)**

0.501 (.119)**

0.471 (.100)**

0.459 (.140)**

0.787 (.236)**

0.085 (.015)**

0.061 (.015)**

0.030 (.017)

0.065 (.014)**

0.081 (.022)**

0.013 (.004)**

0.015 (.004)**

0.010 (.005)

0.013 (.004)**

0.192 (.159)

Standard deviation, daily
stock returns

-2.562 (.625)**

Four-firm share of
industry receipts
Lobbying stock / net
capital
Election spending stock /
net capital
Dummies for missing
R&D, advert., & SGA
Industry group dummies

0.032 (.111)
25.257 (5.023)**
414.34 181.21*
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Year dummies
No. observations

5

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

133,198

133,198

103,958

133,198

46,069

0.545

0.559

0.556

0.568

0.655

3.50

3.66

3.13

3.48

-0.30

0.60

0.50

0.56

0.46

-0.27

-1.08

-0.78

-0.65

-0.83

0.02

5.70

6.26

4.39

1.84

Adjusted R-squared
Percent contribution
R&D stock / net capital
Advertising stock / net
capital
SGA stock / net capital
Regulation index / net capital
Compustat 3 firm
concentration ratio
Standard deviation, daily
stock returns

0.07
-1.32

Four-firm share of industry
0.03
receipts
Lobbying stock / net
0.10
capital
Election spending stock /
0.71
net capital
Change in log Q (percent)
20.39
20.39
16.59
20.39
-11.53
Note: NLLS estimations of equation (3) including dummies for missing data. Robust standard errors clustered by
industry group. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Sample is all US Compustat firms excluding 1%
tails of log Q and financial firms. Percent contribution for variable x is 100 ∙ 𝛽! ∙ (𝑥! − 𝑥! ) where the means are
calculated for the beginning (0) and end years (1) weighted by net capital.
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Table 3. Operating Profits / Sales
1971 - 2014
0.066 (.006)**

Advertising/sales, lagged

0.018 (.013)

0.009 (.007)

0.087 (.030)**

SGA/sales, lagged

0.001 (.001)

0.001 (.000)

0.000 (.000)

0.012 (.001)**

0.013 (.001)**

Regulation words (mill.)

1971 - 2014
0.038 (.006)**

2001 – 2013,
odd years
0.020 (.009)*

A.
R&D/sales, lagged

Lobbying/sales, lagged

0.670 (2.839)

PAC spending/sales, lagged
Capital/sales

288.38 (41.93)**
0.008 (.001)**

0.008 (.001)**

0.009 (.001)**

Major industry dummies
No. of observations

135,968

135,968

29,798

0.178

0.194

0.255

R&D/sales, lagged

0.35

0.20

0.01

Advertising/sales, lagged

0.02

0.01

-0.02

SGA/sales, lagged

0.01

0.00

0.00

1.79

0.72

R-squared
Percent contribution

Regulation words (mill.)
Lobbying/sales, lagged

0.00

PAC spending/sales, lagged
Change in operating margin

0.45
2.51

2.51

B.

2.26
Percent contribution
0.23

R&D/sales, lagged

0.042 (.054)

Advertising/sales, lagged

0.004 (.006)

0.01

SGA/sales, lagged

0.000 (.000)

0.00

-0.001 (.032)

0.01

Regulation by title, (mill.)
Title 7, Agriculture
Title 12, Banking

0.199 (.015)**

2.83

Title 14, Aerospace

-0.187 (.020)**

-0.55

Title 21, Food & Drug

-0.018 (.042)

Title 26, IRS
Title 29, Labor

0.083 (.010)**

0.01
0.69

-0.023 (.011)

-0.13

Title 40, Environment

0.012 (.007)

1.00

Title 47, Telecomm.

0.013 (.016)

0.10

-0.166 (.028)*

-0.47

Title 49, Transportation

0.027 (.012)

0.22

Other titles

0.020 (.012)

0.42

Capital/sales

0.001 (.002)

Title 48, Fed. Acquisition

R-squared
0.328
Note: WLS estimations of equation (4), weighted by real revenues and including dummies for missing data and
year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses in Panel A; errors clustered by industry in B.
**=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Sample is all US Compustat firms excluding 1% tails of
operating margin and firms where R&D > .5*sales. Percent contribution for variable x is 100 ∙ 𝛽! ∙ (𝑥! − 𝑥! )
where the means are calculated for the beginning (0) and end years (1) weighted by real sales. Panel B repeats
column 2 of A, but breaks out separate titles and adds major industry dummy variables.
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Table 4. Granger Causality Regression

Dependent variable:

Do profits Granger-cause
regulation?
Regulation index

Does regulation Grangercause profits?
Operating margin

Operating margin
Lag 1.

0.000

(.000)

0.090

(.001)**

Lag 2.

0.000

(.000)

0.000

(.000)

Lag 3.

0.000

(.000)

0.001

(.000)**

Lag 1.

1.047

(.003)**

0.078

(.014)**

Lag 2.

0.046

(.005)**

-0.017

(.021)

-0.077

(.003)**

-0.074

(.015)**

Regulation index

Lag 3.
No. of observations

109,046

108,938

0.994

0.091

Operating
margin
coefficients

Regulation
coefficients

0.895

0.000

Title 7, Agriculture

0.847

0.000

Title 12, Banking

0.368

0.000

Title 14, Aerospace

0.998

0.000

Title 21, Food & Drug

0.004

0.000

Title 26, IRS

0.489

0.000

Title 29, Labor

0.506

0.000

Title 40, Environment

0.052

0.000

Title 47, Telecomm.

0.838

0.000

Title 48, Fed. Acquisition

0.839

0.000

Title 49, Transportation

0.212

0.000

Other titles

0.860

0.073

R-squared
F-test of joint significance of
coefficients
(P values)
Total

Note: OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level.
Regressions also include year dummy variables. The top panel reports regressions using the composite
regulation index; the bottom panel reports F-test probability values for the joint significance of the relevant
coefficients
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Table 5. Probit Regressions of Major Regulatory Increases
Sample

All events
1

Substantive for industry
2

3

4

Operating margin
Lag 1.

0.000 (.001)

-0.001 (.001)

0.001 (.001)

0.002 (.001)

Lag 2.

0.000 (.000)

0.000 (.000)

0.000 (.000)

0.000 (.000)

Lag 3.

0.000 (.000)

0.000 (.000)

0.000 (.001)

0.000 (.001)

Capital / sales

-0.001 (.001)

Log employment

-0.046 (.006)**

No. of observations

0.001 (.000)
-0.042 (.007)**

15,497

14,179

10,792

10,036

No. of major increases

3,646

3,536

2,816

2,748

Pseudo R-squared
F-test of joint significance
of operating margin
coefficients (Prob. value)

0.203

0.214

0.106

0.118

0.917

0.735

0.510

0.228

Note: probit of the occurrence of major increase in the regulatory index during a given firm-year. The samples
are drawn from the operating margin sample and are limited to observations in the industries linked to the ten
largest titles in the CFR (see text and Appendix A1). Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample further to those
events and industries that represent a substantive change in regulation for the affected industry. Standard errors
in parentheses. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. All regressions include year dummies and
dummies for 1-digit SIC industries; industry coefficients are jointly highly significant.
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Table 6. Difference-in-differences on Major Increases in Regulation, pooled panels
Sample

All

Dependent variable

Substantive for industry

Operating margin

Operating margin

Operating margin

Residual

Control group

Firms without
major change

Firms without
major change

All public firms

Firms without
major change

Control firms

3,237

1,854

Treatment firms

3,960

3,090

Difference before

-0.023 (0.012)*

-0.011 (0.013)

3,090
-0.047 (0.012)**

Residual
Firms without
major change,
propensity score
weighted

1,854

1,854

3,090

3,090

-0.039 (0.011)**

-0.048 (0.007)**

Difference after

0.040 (0.016)**

0.071 (0.017)**

0.025 (0.015)

0.020 (0.015)

0.008 (0.007)

Difference in differences

0.063 (0.011)**

0.081 (0.011)**

0.071 (0.009)**

0.059 (0.011)**

0.056 (0.010)**

Pre-event trend difference

0.142 (0.087)

0.022 (0.024)

0.030 (0.024)

0.005 (0.024)

No. of observations

28,338

19,523

12,453

19,494

19,159

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are calculated by block bootstrapping by firm with 200 repetitions.
**=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. The samples are pooled panels of firms in the treatment
and control groups for three years prior to a major regulatory change and three years after. The first column
includes all selected events; the other columns include only events where the regulatory history indicated a
major substantive change affecting the relevant industry (see Table A1). The pre-event trend is the the change
between three years before and one year before the event; the table reports the difference in this change
between the treatment and control groups. Columns 4 and 5 use a residual from the regression in Column 1 of
Table 3 as the dependent variable in the DID analysis.
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Figure 1. Log Tobin’s Q

Note: Solid lines are kernel smoothed. Black line is aggregate firm value (total liabilities +
inventories – current assets) over firm assets (nonfinancial assets excluding intellectual
property products plus equity and investment fund shares) for the nonfinancial corporate
sector, using data from the System of National Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Ni_FedBeaSna/Index.asp. Gray line is from
Compustat data for non-financial firms, sample and variables described in the text.
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Figure 2. Operating Margins

Note: Solid lines are kernel smoothed. Black line is from the System of National Accounts,
Bureau of Economic Analysis. It shows the ratio of the net operating surplus to gross value
added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the ratio of
aggregate operating income after depreciation before taxes to revenues for firms publicly
listed in the US.
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Figure 3. Words in Title 12, Banks and Banking, weighted by relevance to NAICS industry
522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
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Appendix. Tobin’s Q equation
I adapt a simplified version of Hayashi (1982) to incorporate multiple capital stocks
where the aggregate capital stock, K, is a linear combination of different types of capital
stocks, 𝑘! ,
(A1)

𝐾 𝑡 =

! 𝛾! 𝑘! (𝑡).

The 𝛾! coefficients represent the relative profit-generating potential of different types of
capital (Hall 1993). Let i=0 represent tangible capital and normalize 𝛾! = 1. Assuming for
simplicity that firms optimize variable inputs at each point in time and the production
function has constant returns to scale, operating profits can be written as a linear function of
aggregate capital, 𝜋 𝐾 𝑡

= 𝛼𝐾.

Investments in each type of capital, 𝑥! , do not translate directly into increases in the
capital stock because of adjustment costs. Adapting Hayashi,
(A2)

𝐾 = 𝐺 𝑥! , 𝑥! , 𝑥! , … , 𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾,

where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate and G is linear homogeneous. The dynamic optimization
problem is to maximize firm value, assumed to be the present value of future net profits,
(A3)

𝑉=

!
!

𝜋 𝐾; 𝑡 −

! 𝑝! 𝑥!

𝑒 !!" 𝑑𝑡,

subject to constraint (A2), where 𝑝! is the price of investment good i And r is the discount
rate. The present value Hamiltonian is
(A4)

𝐻 𝑥! , 𝑥! , 𝑥! , … , 𝐾; 𝑡 = 𝜋 𝐾; 𝑡 −

! 𝑝! 𝑥!

+ 𝜆 𝐺 𝑥! , 𝑥! , 𝑥! , … , 𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾

and the necessary conditions for a maximum are:
!"
!!!

(A5)

!"
!"

!"

= −𝑝! + 𝜆 !! = 0,
!

=

!"
!"

+𝜆

!"
!"

− 𝜆𝛿 = −𝜆 + 𝑟𝜆, and
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lim!→! 𝜆 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡 𝑒 !!" = 0 (transversality condition).
Note that because G is homogenous of degree 1,
(A6)

!"

𝐺 = !" 𝐾 +

!"
! !!

!

𝑥! .

Using the above, with some manipulation,
(A7)

!
!"

𝜆𝐾𝑒 !!" = 𝜆𝐾 + 𝜆𝐾 − 𝜆𝐾𝑟 𝑒 !!" = −𝜋 +

! 𝑝! 𝑥!

𝑒 !!" .

Taking the integral of (A7) with respect to t from 0 to infinity and using the transversality
condition gives
(A8)

−𝜆 0 𝐾 0 =

!
!

−𝜋 +

! 𝑝! 𝑥!

𝑒 !!" 𝑑𝑡.

Following Hayashi, marginal 𝑞 ≡ 𝜆 𝑝! , so that
(A9)

𝑉(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝐾(𝑡) = 𝑞(𝑡)𝑝! (𝑡)

! 𝛾! 𝑘! (𝑡),

or Tobin’s average Q is (using t as a subscript as in the text)
(A10) 𝑄! ≡ !

!!

!! !!!

!

!

= 𝑞! 1 + 𝛾! !!! + 𝛾! !!! + ⋯ .
!!

!!
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